We'll begin on November 24, 1896, with Librarian of Congress Ainsworth R. Spofford.
The Library was about to move from the Capitol building into the newly-built Thomas Jefferson building. And on this day Spofford was testifying to a joint Congressional committee gathering information on the condition of the Library in preparation for the move. 1 In this particular session the committee asked Spofford to explain the Library's classification system. One by one, in reverse order, he went through the 44 divisions. Each time he gave a broad overview of the subjects within that division. Each time his Congressional interrogator, Representative Lemuel Quigg of New York, asked about a particular book or author.
When Spofford listed the contents of division 29, on geography and travel, Quigg asked about Marco Polo and Captain Cook. When Spofford described division 26, on metaphysics, Quigg asked about Immanuel Kant. So when Spofford enumerated division 15, the technical arts and sciences, he explained that it was a "very large division, with numerous subdivisions," and listed After the United States's Civil War, as white settlers colonized the interior of the country, U. S. mercantile and political interests became concerned about what would happen to economic growth once the settlement process had been completed. They began to look beyond their borders, at Latin America and overseas, as potential markets for American goods as well as sources of raw materials. Some in Congress and in the Navy bureaucracy, in favor of mercantile expansion, also argued that a greatly expanded and professionalized navy would be necessary to secure trade. And such an expanded navy with an essential role for America's well-being, would need officers ready for the task. 
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From the beginning Luce had ambitious goals for the Naval War College, goals that encompassed yet went beyond merely serving as a post-graduate course for naval officers. In 1885 the secretary of the Navy, an ally of Luce's, proposed that the school encompass the whole of "the study of naval warfare and international law and their cognate branches." Luce brought to this study of naval warfare the belief that it should be conducted scientifically, using the methods that had been successful in increasing the knowledge and prestige of what today we'd call the humanities and natural sciences. Science, for Luce, was the discovery of general laws through a close study of particulars --a process of induction rather than deduction. We know this approach today as positivism. 5 To study naval warfare as a science, one merely had to compile the mass of facts that could be derived from naval battles throughout history, and use those to develop a set of general principles. Those principles, being universal, could then be applied to modern problems. For Mahan as it had been for Luce, science was a positivist enterprise: the collection of specifics in order to derive general principles. Yet Mahan's ambitions were larger. Luce had wanted to study battles from the age of sail in order to arrive at principles from which could be derived the proper course of conducting a battle in the modern age of steam. Luce's interests were thus primarily tactical. Mahan's, in contrast, were strategic. Mahan wanted to study not merely the course of battles, but the geopolitical deployment of "sea power" and to show how "sea power" had influenced the course of history. The principles thus arrived at could then lay it's mostly books by Mahan; of the three others, Mahan has written the introduction to one and "assisted" with another, along with that Roosevelt fellow again. 13 We know the Library of Congress was aware of the increase in books relating to the Spanish-American War as well as the public's interest in the same.
In early 1898 Publishers' Weekly announced that the Library of Congress had compiled a bibliography of works relating to Cuba, which they would send to any library free of charge. 
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But the final classification, produced in 1904, would reverse that trend and more. Now naval science was not just separated from engineering, but had been removed from military science as well into a coequal top-level class.
According to Francis Miksa, the 1904 classification represented Hanson and Martel's map of the universe of knowledge. We argue, then, that given Luce and Mahan's belief that with positivist methods the history of naval affairs could be raised to a science, it surely marked a success for them that naval science had finally been acknowledged as its own domain of knowledge. Yet knowledge, in the 1904 classification, was no longer a reflection of faculties of the human mind. Rather, knowledge was defined by the books that had been produced with those specialized disciplines. Luce and Mahan's success, then, was a result not of skillful thought so much as a sophisticated marketing of ideas congenial to the country's imperialist elite, via publishing vehicles that appealed to a public engaged in the consumption of information. 
